Event-B Specification of a Situated Multi-Agent System: Study of a Platoon of Vehicles by Lanoix, Arnaud
Event-B Specification of a Situated Multi-Agent System:
Study of a Platoon of Vehicles
Arnaud Lanoix
To cite this version:
Arnaud Lanoix. Event-B Specification of a Situated Multi-Agent System: Study of a Platoon
of Vehicles. 2nd IFIP/IEEE International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Software
Engineering (TASE 2008), Jun 2008, France. 8 p., 2008. <hal-00260577>
HAL Id: hal-00260577
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00260577
Submitted on 4 Mar 2008
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
Event-B Specification of a Situated Multi-Agent System:
Study of a Platoon of Vehicles∗
Arnaud Lanoix
LORIA, DEDALE Team – Campus scientifique
F-54506 Vandoeuvre-Lès-Nancy, France
arnaud.lanoix@loria.fr
Abstract
Situated Multi-Agents Systems (MAS), and other Agent-
based systems, are often complex. Formal reasoning is
needed to ensuring their correctness and structuring their
development. Event-B is a formal method with tool support
allowing a stepwise development of reactive distributed sys-
tems. MAS being a subclass of such systems, we propose
using Event-B to helpful their specification and their safe
development. In this article, we mainly report our expe-
rience with the Even-B stepwise development of a situated
MAS which study the displacement of vehicles in a convoy.
This article aims also at serving as a guide for the devel-
opment of other MAS, taking agents-specific features into
account.
1. Introduction
Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) are widely used for devel-
oping applications in the field of transportation, medical
technologies or space exploration. The difficulty of design-
ing and studying situated MAS comes from the autonomy
of the agents and their interactions within a common en-
vironment. Agents are software entities that encapsulate
their behaviour and can change, both pro-actively and re-
actively, their environment. These systems are highly dis-
tributed, where agents evolve in parallel, and more gen-
erally work in a dynamic environment. Individually, the
agents may be very complex. Due to the contexts these sys-
tems are used in, i.e. critical contexts, the problem of en-
suring their safety arises. The development of correct/safe
situated MAS is difficult with traditional software develop-
ment methods. Hence, formal methods are needed in order
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and by the pôle de compétitivité Alsace/Franche-comté in the context of
the CRISTAL project.
to ensure their correctness and structure their development
from specification to implementation.
The B method [1] is a formal method provided with good
tool support, but originally developed to model and reason
about sequential programs. Event-B [2] is an evolution of
the B method that is more suitable for developing large re-
active and distributed systems. Software development in
Event-B begins by abstractly specifying the requirements
of the whole system and then refining them through several
steps to reach a concrete description of the system which
can be translated to code. Consistency of each model and
each relationship between an abstract model and its refine-
ments is obtained by proving it. Recently, tool support has
been provided for Event-B specification and proof in the
Rodin platform.
We are interested in the so-called platooning problem
presented in Sect. 2, where the goal is to have several ve-
hicles travelling in a convoy by defining simple rules for
each of them. Moving in a convoy is thus their emergent
behaviour. In a previous work, we have developed classi-
cal B models for this problem [13]. In this paper,we focus
on an Event-B specification of the platooning problem and
its application on the Rodin platform. The goal of this re-
search is to demonstrate the use of formal development in
the context of MAS oriented software. Section 3 presents
Event-B. Next, we describe the Event-B model of the pla-
tooning problem we have realised in Sect. 4: we focus on
the different steps of refinement necessary for establishing
the whole model of the platoon. We also study the valida-
tion of the model by presenting the difficulties automatic
prover had with some proof obligations and explaining how
they were manually discharged. From this case study, we
thus extract some generic guidelines for specifying situated
MAS with Event-B, presented in Sect. 5. Section 6 presents
some related works and Section 7 concludes this paper by
giving some perspectives.
2. A Platoon of Vehicles
The CRISTAL project involves the development of a new
type of urban vehicle with new functionalities and services.
One of the major cornerstones of Cristal is the platooning
problem.
A platoon is defined as a set of autonomous vehicles
which have to move in a convoy, i.e. following the path
of the leader (possibly driven by a human being) in a row
(or a platoon). The control of a platoon involves the lon-
gitudinal control of the vehicles, i.e. maintaining a certain
ideal distance between each other, and their lateral control,
i.e. each vehicle should follow the track of its predecessor.
Those controls can be studied independently [4]; we will
only focus on the longitudinal control.
Through projects’ collaboration with researchers of the
MAIA team, we consider each vehicle as an agent. A ve-
hicle’s controller perceives informations about its environ-
ment before producing an instantaneous acceleration passed
to the engine. In this context, the platooning problem can be
considered as a situated multi-agent system (MAS) which
evolves following a the Influence/Reaction model. This
classical MAS model, proposed by Ferber & Muller [8, 7],
organises the dynamics of situated MAS by synchronising
the various evolution steps: (i) all the agents perceptions
are done, (ii) all influences are decided, and (iii) the envi-
ronment reacts by combining all the influences.
Figure 1. A platoon of vehicles
As we focus on the longitudinal control, the considered
space is one-dimensional. Hence the position of the ith ve-
hicle is represented by a single variable xposi, its velocity
by speedi. The behaviour of the vehicle’s controllers can be
summarised as follows, see Fig. 1:
(i) perception step: each vehicle’s controller uses sen-
sors for estimating its velocity p_speedi, the dis-
tance p_disti to its leading vehicle and the velocity
p_pre_speedi of its leading vehicle. The sensors are
supposed to be perfect. Of course, the leader does not
need the last two pieces of information as it has no
preceding vehicle:
p_speed′i = speedi
p_dist ′i = xposi−1− xposi
p_pre_speed′i = speedi−1
}
if i > 1
(ii) decision step: each vehicle’s controller can influence
its speed by computing and passing to the engine an
instantaneous acceleration acceli. The acceleration
can be negative, corresponding to the braking of the
vehicle. acceli is defined according to the sensor val-
ues using mathematical laws, but which cannot be
given here for confidentiality reasons.
(iii) reaction step: xposi and speedi are updated, depend-
ing on the current speed speedi of the vehicle and a de-
cided instantaneous acceleration acceli passed to the
engine.
new_speed = speedi +acceli
xpos′i =
(
xposi +Max_Speed
− (Max_Speed−speedi)
2
2.acceli
)
speed′i = Max_Speed
if
 new_speed>
Max_speed

xpos′i = xposi−
speed2i
2.acceli
speed′i = 0
}
if new_speed < 0
xpos′i = xposi + speedi +
acceli
2
speed′i = new_speed
}
otherwise
These mathematical laws assume that the actuators of
the engine are perfect. Three cases are distinguished,
depending on the considered new speed.
Note. Our goal is to develop a formal framework in or-
der to implement these laws and prove properties of the ob-
tained model. The properties we are looking forward to in
this model are among the following: (i) the model is sound
bound-wise, i.e. none of the specified bounds are violated,
(ii) no collision occurs between the vehicles, (iii) no un-
hooking occurs, i.e. the distance between vehicles cannot
be infinitely long and (iv) no oscillation occurs, i.e. a phe-
nomenon of a wave propagates from ahead of the platoon to
its back, without never stabilising.
We focus on the soundness of the model and the absence
of collision in the remainder of this document, but the reader
must be aware that it is still an ongoing work.
3. Event-B
In order to be able to specify and verify correct situated
MAS and other agent-based systems, we need to reason
about these systems in a formal manner. Reasoning should
be facilitated by adequate tool support. Event-B [2] is a for-
mal language for modelling and reasoning about systems.
It is an evolution of the classical B [1] for developing reac-
tive and distributed systems. Event-B is provided with tool
support currently in the form of a platform for specification
and proof called Rodin1.
1http://rodin-b-sharp.sourceforge.net
Abstract Specifications An Event-B abstract specifica-
tion of a system is encapsulated into a MODEL clause
identified by an unique name. To each variable x in the
VARIABLES clause is associated a domain of values. The
data invariant I (x) in the INVARIANT clause defines the state
space of the variables and their safety properties.
Each event in the EVENTS clause is a substitution
statement. The semantic of these substitution statements
are given by the weakest precondition calculus devel-
oped by Dijkstra [5]. Notice that a specific event called
initialisation appears into each Event-B model. The state
variables are initialised into this event. An event consists of
a guard and a body. When the guard of an event is evalu-
ated to true, the event can be enabled. When the guards of
several events are true, the choice of the triggered event is
non-deterministic.
In addition to Event-B models, a CONTEXT can be de-
fined to specify static data of sets, constants and their ax-
ioms. A model SEES at least one context.
Proof obligations (POs) are generated to ensure the con-
sistency of the model, i.e. the preservation of the invariant
by the events.
Refinement A refinement process is used to progress to-
wards implementation. An abstract model is transformed
into a more concrete and elaborate model. A refined
model specifies the abstract model it refines into a REFINES
clause. New variables can be introduced and the old vari-
ables can be refined to more concrete ones. This is reflected
in the substitutions of the events as well.
New events may also be introduced. These new events
should not prevent forever the events already present from
being triggered. A VARIANT, which is a natural number ex-
pression that the new events must decrease, is introduced for
ensuring it. Furthermore, we can also merge several abstract
events into one single event, as well as refine one abstract
event by several events, as is permitted by an event-level
REFINES clause. An event-level WITH clause expresses the
link between the parameters of an abstract event, removed
in the refined event, and their concretisation.
POs ensure that the refined model is consistent, i.e. its
INVARIANT is preserved and that the VARIANT is decreased
by the new events. Furthermore, they ensure that the refine-
ment is correct, i.e. the refined events do not contradict their
abstract counterpart. The abstract INVARIANT is also shown
to be preserved.
Decomposition The approach of decomposition in Event-
B is the inverse of the usual compositional approach in soft-
ware design and programming. It allows the splitting of an
Event-B model into smaller components for managing the
increasing complexity of the design. Correspondingly, each
proof task should be smaller, thus provable more automati-
cally.
The variables of the initial model are divided into exter-
nal and internal variables: the local variables are variables
which concern only one component whereas external vari-
ables represent shared variables which can be modified by
all the components; they are replicated in all the decom-
posed models.
The events referring only the local variables of one com-
ponent only appear in the relevant component. The oth-
ers which refer local and external variables appear in the
component which reference the local variables. In addition,
extra external events simulating their corresponding events
using external variables only, must appear in the other com-
ponents.
4. Event-B Specification of a Platoon
Figure 2 gives the various components of the Event-B
specification of the platooning problem. The development
is done following a stepwise refinement based on the I/R
model. The I/R steps are gradually introduced:
1. platoon: it represents an overview of the platooning
problem. The movement of the vehicles, correspond-
ing to the reaction step, is globally viewed.
The safety requirement of no-collision is expressed so
far.
2. platoon_1: the global movement is split into each ve-
hicle.
3. platoon_2: the speed of each vehicle is introduced.
The movement of each vehicle is now defined as the
application to the current speed of an acceleration
passed to the engine (reaction laws).
4. platoon_3: the acceleration of each vehicle is now de-
cided before the vehicles move. That corresponds to
the specification of the decision step.
5. platoon_4: the controllers perceive (perception step),
before they decide for an acceleration by applying the
decision laws.
Furthermore, a context is required for defining the global
constants and axioms of the case study. It is seen by all the
other models.
The following sections detail the refinement steps, their
Event-B specifications and their verification using Rodin.
4.1. Introducing the Reaction Step and Pre-
venting Collisions: platoon
The Event-B model platoon represents the first specifi-
cation of the platooning problem. Only the longitudinal po-
Figure 2. Even-B models of platooning
sitions of each vehicle are viewed. All the vehicles move
in a simultaneous movement. We focus on the major safety
property of the system: no collision must occur between a
vehicle and its predecessor.
Event-B specification The positions are expressed by
a functional variable xpos0 ∈ 1..VEHICLES → NAT which
links together the index of a vehicle and its longitudinal po-
sition. The leader vehicle is indexed by 1. The no-collision
property is expressed by the invariant:
∀ v .(v ∈ 2..VEHICLES
⇒ (xpos0(v−1) − xpos0(v)) > CRITICAL_DISTANCE)
A single event all_moves models the simultaneous move-
ment of all the vehicles. New positions for the vehicles are
“magically” chosen with respect to the safety property and
are affected to the previous positions:
all_moves =̂
ANY magic_xpos WHERE
magic_xpos ∈ 1..VEHICLES → N ∧
∀v. (v ∈ 2..VEHICLES ⇒
(magic_xpos(v−1) − magic_xpos(v)) > CRITICAL_DISTANCE)
THEN
xpos0 := magic_xpos
END
Total Automatic Manual Reviewed Unproved
platoon 6 5 83% 1 0 0
Verification by proof Rodin generates the necessary POs
for validating the preservation of the invariant by the model.
All the POs are discharged automatically by the prover. The
only manual PO involves the initialisation of the position of
each vehicle:
initial_xpos (v−1) − initial_xpos(v) > CRITICAL_DISTANCE
This proof has been done with Rodin as follows:
The hypothesis ∀v.( v ∈ 1..VEHICLES ⇒ initial_xpos(v)
= (VEHICLES−v)∗IDEAL_DISTANCE) is instantiated with
v: initial_xpos (v) = (VEHICLES−v)∗IDEAL_DISTANCE
It is also instantiated with v−1: initial_xpos (v−1) =
(VEHICLES−v+1)∗IDEAL_DISTANCE
We substitute the previous results into the
goal, and simplify the formula that becomes
IDEAL_DISTANCE > CRITICAL_DISTANCE: the prover
shows the goal is verified.
4.2. Splitting the Reaction Step: platoon_1
The simultaneous movement of all the vehicles is de-
composed, i.e. the movement of each vehicle is viewed one
after the other, starting from the leader.
Event-B specification In order to identify the cur-
rent vehicle which has to move, a variable vehicle ∈
1..VEHICLES+1 is introduced. Another new variable
xpos ∈ 1..VEHICLES → NAT is introduced for modelling
the position of each vehicle during the movement. The
safety property has to be strengthened: now, we ensure that
after each single movement, no collision has occured up to
the vehicle which has to move:
∀ v .(v ∈ 2..vehicle−1 ⇒ (xpos(v−1) − xpos(v)) > CRITICAL_DISTANCE)
Note that this safety property implies the previous one when
vehicle=VEHICLES+1.
Because the leader vehicle has a specific behaviour, two
new events are introduced for modelling the single move-
ment of a vehicle:
• move1 models the movement of the leader vehicle. A
new position magic_xpos_vehicle is chosen with the
only constraint that the vehicle moves forward.
• move models the movement of each following
vehicle, one after the other. A new position
magic_xpos_vehicle is chosen such that the vehicle
moves without colliding into its preceding vehicle.
Moreover, it must move forward: the new chosen po-
sition is greater than the previous one.
move =̂
ANY magic_xpos_vehicle WHERE
vehicle ∈ 2..VEHICLES ∧
magic_xpos_vehicle ∈ N ∧
magic_xpos_vehicle ≥ xpos(vehicle) ∧
xpos(vehicle−1) − magic_xpos_vehicle > CRITICAL_DISTANCE
THEN
vehicle := vehicle+1 ‖ xpos(vehicle) := magic_xpos_vehicle
END
Wemust express a variant to ensure that these new events
do not take the control for ever. Because vehicle is increased
after each move, the variant we consider is:
(VEHICLES+1) − vehicle
When vehicle=VEHICLES+1, all the movements are
done. We refine the abstract event all_moves by choosing
the new variable xpos as a correct value (a witness) of the
previous parameter magic_xpos.
all_moves =̂
REFINES all_moves
WHEN
vehicle = VEHICLES + 1
WITH magic_xpos = xpos
THEN
xpos0 := xpos ‖ vehicle := 1
END
Total Automatic Manual Reviewed Unproved
platoon_1 22 19 86% 3 0 0
Verification by proof Among the manual proofs that re-
main to do after discharging the POs, one is most interest-
ing: we have to show that the invariant of no-collision is
preserved when a vehicle moves, i.e. a new position is cho-
sen.
(xpos⊳−{vehicle 7→ magic_xpos_vehicle})(v − 1)
− (xpos⊳−{vehicle 7→ magic_xpos_vehicle})(v)>CRITICAL_DISTANCE
We have the following hypotheses:
v ∈ 2..vehicle
∧ ∀ v . (v∈2..(vehicle−1) ⇒ xpos(v−1) − xpos(v) > CRITICAL_DISTANCE)
∧ xpos(vehicle−1) − magic_xpos_vehicle > CRITICAL_DISTANCE
Into Rodin, we separate the case of the updated vehicle from
the other vehicles by rewriting the operator ⊳− to obtain:
(({ vehicle} ⊳− xpos) U {vehicle 7→ magic_xpos_vehicle})(v−1)
− (({vehicle} ⊳− xpos) U {vehicle 7→ magic_xpos_vehicle})(v)
> CRITICAL_DISTANCE
We add a new sub-goal v ∈ 2..( vehicle−1) ∨ v=vehicle and
run a proof by cases.
1. v ∈ 2..( vehicle−1)
Hypothesis (b) is instantiated with v:
xpos(v−1) − xpos(v) > CRITICAL_DISTANCE
We add some new sub-goals, until we re-obtain the
goal:
• xpos(v−1)=({vehicle} ⊳− xpos)(v−1),
• xpos(v)=({vehicle} ⊳− xpos)(v),
• xpos(v−1)=(({vehicle} ⊳− xpos)
U {vehicle 7→ magic_xpos_vehicle})(v−1),
• xpos(v)=(({vehicle} ⊳− xpos)
U {vehicle 7→ magic_xpos_vehicle})(v),
2. v=vehicle
By simplification rewriting, the goal becomes:
(({ vehicle} ⊳− xpos) U {vehicle 7→ magic_xpos_vehicle})
(vehicle−1) − magic_xpos_vehicle >
CRITICAL_DISTANCE
We add some new sub-goals:
• xpos(vehicle−1)=({vehicle} ⊳− xpos)(vehicle−1),
• xpos(vehicle−1)=(({vehicle} ⊳− xpos)
U {vehicle 7→ magic_xpos_vehicle})(vehicle−1).
All the introduced sub-goals are proved into Rodin,
hence this PO is verified. The other manual POs are also
verified and we are confident that
• platoon_1 is consistent, i.e. its invariant is preserved,
• platoon_1 is a correct refinement of platoon, i.e. the
no-collision property verified by platoon is preserved
by platoon_1, and
• the new events introduced into platoon_1 do not take
the control forever.
Remark Notice that a lot of manual POs follow the same
scheme of proof: (i) rewrite of the operator⊳− and (ii) proof
by cases on v ∈ 2..( vehicle−1) ∨ v=vehicle.
4.3. Implementing the Reaction Laws:
platoon_2
The movement of each vehicle is now defined as a reac-
tion to an instantaneous acceleration passed to the engine.
The speed of the vehicle must now be considered in order
to apply the acceleration and compute the new position.
Event-B specification To model the instantaneous
speed of each vehicle, a variable speed ∈ 1..VEHICLES
→ 0..MAX_SPEED is introduced. The events move1 and
move are refined by considering an acceleration parameter
magic_accel and computing the new speed nspeed and
position nxpos resulting from the application of this
acceleration. These reaction laws are given in Sect. 2. As
three cases have to be distinguished depending on the new
computing speed, the event move is refined as follows:
1. move_normal: the vehicle travels within the acceptable
speed limits (nspeed ∈ 0..MAX_SPEED);
2. move_max: the vehicle violates the maximum possi-
ble/allowed speed (nspeed > MAX_SPEED);
move_max =̂
REFINES move
ANY magic_accel, nxpos WHERE
vehicle ∈ 2..VEHICLES ∧
magic_accel ∈ MIN_ACCEL..MAX_ACCEL ∧
speed(vehicle) + magic_accel > MAX_SPEED ∧
nxpos = xpos(vehicle) + MAX_SPEED − ((MAX_SPEED − speed(vehicle))
× (MAX_SPEED − speed(vehicle))) / (2 × magic_accel) ∧
xpos(vehicle−1) − nxpos > CRITICAL_DISTANCE
WITH magic_xpos_vehicle = nxpos
THEN
vehicle := vehicle+1 ‖ xpos(vehicle) := nxpos ‖
speed(vehicle) := MAX_SPEED
END
3. move_reduce: the vehicle goes backwards
(nspeed < 0).
The same refinement occurs for event move1. All
these events take the new computed position nxpos
as a correct value of the previous abstract parameter
magic_xpos_vehicle.
Total Automatic Manual Reviewed Unproved
platoon_2 43 27 63% 12 4 0
Verification by proof We mainly have to prove the con-
sistency of the computation of the new position when ap-
plying the acceleration. All these POs are difficult to handle
for the prover, due to arithmetics, in particular with the divi-
sion operator, and the rewriting of (in)equalities that guide
the proof.
• Four POs have to be proved to ensure the soundness
of the computation of the new position, in the normal
case:
xpos(vehicle) + speed(vehicle) + magic_accel/2 ∈ N
We have speed(vehicle) + magic_accel ≥ 0.
The proof is done by adding and proving successively
these “necessary” sub-goals into Rodin:
– magic_accel ≥ −speed(vehicle)
– magic_accel ≥ −speed(vehicle) × 2
– magic_accel/2 ≥ (−speed(vehicle) × 2)/2
– speed(vehicle)+magic_accel/2 ≥ 0
– xpos(vehicle) ≥ 0
– xpos(vehicle)+speed(vehicle)+magic_accel/2 ≥ 0
The other POs can be done easily just by cutting and
pasting the previous proof tree.
• Four POs have to be proved for ensuring that the new
position is consistent when the vehicle attempts to go
backwards. These POs are discharged by decomposing
the goal into some sub-goals before proving them with
Rodin as previously.
• Four POs have to be proved for ensuring the soundness
of the new position when the vehicle violates the max-
imum possible speed. This PO cannot be discharged
with Rodin, but can be done by pen and paper, since
Rodin is unable to prove a rewriting of the goal.
As all the POs are verified, then we can conclude that
the computations are consistent and that platoon_2 refines
platoon_1 and the no-collision property is preserved.
4.4. Introducing the Decision Step: platoon_3
In the previous model, instantaneous accelerations are
passed to the engine to move the vehicles. In this refinement
step, we introduce the vehicle’s controllers that decide of
the accelerations.
Event-B specification A variable accel ∈ 1..VEHICLES
→ MIN_ACCEL..MAX_ACCEL is introduced to save the de-
cided acceleration until the movement happens. Another
new variable d_vehicle ∈ 1..VEHICLES+1 has to be intro-
duced for identifying the current vehicle’s controller which
has to decide for an acceleration.
Two new events decide1 and decide are introduced for
modelling the decision step. A correct acceleration is cho-
sen magically and saved into accel. The event decide1 is
enabled only once, when d_vehicle=1. decide is enabled
until d_vehicle=VEHICLES+1.
decide =̂
ANY magic_accel WHERE
vehicle = 1 ∧
d_vehicle ∈ 2..VEHICLES ∧
magic_accel ∈ MIN_ACCEL..MAX_ACCEL
THEN
d_vehicle := d_vehicle + 1 ‖ accel(d_vehicle) := magic_accel
END
As new events are introduced, a variant must be defined
to prove that these new events do not take control for ever.
The variable d_vehicle is increased by each new events, then
a correct variant can be
(VEHICLES+1) − d_vehicle
The guard of the old events are strengthened by
d_vehicle=VEHICLES+1 to ensure that all the controller’s
decisions are taken before the vehicles move. The events
corresponding to move are refined by taking into account
the decided accel instead of magic_accel.
move_max =̂
REFINES move_max
ANY nxpos WHERE
vehicle ∈ 2..VEHICLES ∧
speed(vehicle) + accel(vehicle) > MAX_SPEED ∧
nxpos = xpos(vehicle) + MAX_SPEED − ((MAX_SPEED − speed(vehicle))
× (MAX_SPEED − speed(vehicle))) / (2 × accel(vehicle) ∧
xpos(vehicle−1) − nxpos > CRITICAL_DISTANCE ∧
d_vehicle = VEHICLES + 1
WITH magic_accel = accel(vehicle)
THEN
vehicle := vehicle+1 ‖ xpos(vehicle) := nxpos ‖ speed(vehicle) := MAX_SPEED
END
Total Automatic Manual Reviewed Unproved
platoon_3 62 56 90% 6 0 0
Corrections guided by the proof Often, unproved POs
indicate failures or mistakes into the model. The next PO
has been generated:
xpos(d_vehicle−1) − (xpos(d_vehicle) + speed(d_vehicle) + magic_accel/2) >
CRITICAL_DISTANCE
We are unable to discharge this PO. It shows that we for-
got into the event decide a precondition linking magic_accel
and CRITICAL_DISTANCE. By adding the correct precon-
dition, the PO becomes automatically proved.
Verification by proof Rodin generates a lot of POs to val-
idate the preservation of the invariant and the refinement.
The majority of them is discharged automatically by the
prover, only six are to be proved interactively. One of them
concerns the preservation of the no-collision property by the
decision:
xpos(v−1) − (xpos(v) + speed(v) + (accel⊳−{d_vehicle 7→ magic_accel})(v) / 2) >
CRITICAL_DISTANCE
This PO is discharged following the same reasoning as in
Subsect. 4.2, by rewriting the operator ⊳− and making a
proof by case on v ∈ 2..(d_vehicle−1) ∨ v=d_vehicle.
4.5. Introducing the Perception Step and
Implementing the Decision Laws:
platoon_4
In this step, we model the perceptions that the vehicle’s
controllers have on their environment, i.e. the controlled
vehicle and the leading one. The decision laws can then be
derived from the perceptions.
Event-B specification The perceptions of a controller
about its environment are:
• its velocity p_speed ∈ 1..VEHICLES → 0..MAX_SPEED,
• the distance p_dist ∈ 2..VEHICLES → Z to its leading
vehicle, and
• the velocity p_pre_speed ∈ 2..VEHICLES → 0..MAX_
SPEED of its leading vehicle.
A variable p_vehicle ∈ 1..VEHICLES+1 has been intro-
duced for identifying the current vehicle’s controller that
has to be perceived. To ensure that all the perceptions are
done before deciding and moving, we strengthen the guard
of the old events by p_vehicle = VEHICLES + 1.
Two new events perceive1 and perceive are introduced
for modelling the perception step. The leader vehicle has
no predecessor, so it is a specific case.
perceive =̂
WHEN
vehicle = 1 ∧
d_vehicle = 1 ∧
p_vehicle ∈ 2..VEHICLES ∧
THEN
p_vehicle := p_vehicle + 1 ‖ p_speed(p_vehicle) := speed(p_vehicle) ‖
p_dist(p_vehicle) := xpos(p_vehicle−1) − xpos(p_vehicle) ‖
p_pre_speed(p_vehicle) := speed(p_vehicle−1)
END
As aforementioned, a variant has to be defined. p_vehicle is
used to know which vehicle has to perceive, then a variant
can be
(VEHICLES+1) − p_vehicle
The decision of the acceleration is computed from the
perceptions. The events decide1 and decide are refined by
seven events implementing the decision laws and depending
on whether
• the vehicle is the leader or not,
• the perceived distance is less than an alert distance
value,
• the decided acceleration is between MIN_ACCEL and
MAX_ACCEL, or not.
decide_min =̂
REFINES decide
ANY naccel WHERE
vehicle = 1 ∧
d_vehicle ∈ 2..VEHICLES ∧
p_vehicle = VEHICLES+1 ∧
p_dist(d_vehicle) ≥ ALERT_DISTANCE ∧
naccel = 2 × (p_dist(d_vehicle) − IDEAL_DISTANCE
+ p_pre_speed(d_vehicle) − p_speed(d_vehicle)) ∧
naccel < MIN_ACCEL
WITH magic_accel = MIN_ACCEL
THEN
d_vehicle := d_vehicle+1 ‖ accel(d_vehicle) := MIN_ACCEL
END
Total Automatic Manual Reviewed Unproved
platoon_4 80 70 87% 6 3 1
Corrections guided by the proof An unproved PO indi-
cates a mistake into the model. First the perceived distance
p_dist was defined as a function from 2..VEHICLES to N.
A PO was generated about the consistency of p_dist.
p_dist ⊳− {p_vehicle 7→ xpos(p_vehicle − 1) − xpos(p_vehicle)} ∈
2 .. VEHICLES → N
Rodin is unable to prove that xpos(p_vehicle−1)
− xpos(p_vehicle) ≥ 0. We have no hypothesis that
can help the proof, then the PO indicates a mistake. When
changing the type of p_dist to Z, the corresponding PO
becomes automatically discharged.
Verification by proof Most of the POs are automat-
ically discharged by the prover, save for only 10 un-
proved POs. 6 of them can be proved manually by
rewriting the ⊳− operator and doing a proof by case
on v∈2..(p_vehicle−1) ∨ v=p_vehicle as explained in Sub-
sect. 4.2.
Three POs involve the correctness of the decision for an
acceleration in the normal case (i.e. the perceived distance
is more than ALERT_DISTANCE). These POs cannot be
proved with Rodin for arithmetical reasons: the prover is
unable to validate the suggested rewriting which is neces-
sary to achieve the proofs, but they are done by hand.
Unprovable PO At the moment of writing, the remain-
ing unproved PO concerns the decision for the acceleration
when the perceived distance between the vehicles is less
than ALERT_DISTANCE:
xpos(d_vehicle−1) − (xpos(d_vehicle)+speed(d_vehicle)+MIN_ACCEL/2) >
CRITICAL_DISTANCE
This PO seems to be unprovable under the current hypothe-
ses. It indicates a mistake or a failure in the current model.
We are discussing with experts of the domain for making
the current model evolve.
4.6. Decomposing the Model between Vehi-
cles and Controllers
The controllers of the vehicles must be separated from
the environment. The model platoon_4 can be decomposed
in two parts: vehicles and controllers as shown Fig. 3.
Figure 3. Decomposition of platoon_4
Event-B specification The variables are split between ex-
ternal and internal variables. The local internal variables
of the controllers model are the perceptions that the con-
trollers have from their associated vehicles and the prede-
cessor. Considering the vehicles model, the only local vari-
able is the position xpos0 of the vehicles after all the move-
ment. All the other variables are external. This includes the
counters vehicle, d_vehicle and p_vehicle, the variables of
the environment xpos and speed which are perceived and
the decided influence accel.
The events of the model platoon_4 are also split among
the decomposed models. The internal events of vehicles in-
volve the movement of the vehicles whereas internal events
of controllers are dedicated to perceptions and decisions.
Extra external events must be added to the decomposed
models in order to “simulate” (using the external variables
only) the corresponding events of the full model. The events
perceive and decide of vehicles abstract the behaviours
of perceive1, perceive and decide1_n∨mal, decide1_max,
decide1_min, decide_n∨mal, decide_critic , decide_max,
decide_min respectively. The same goes for themove events
into controllers .
Remark Notice that this last step cannot be verified by
Rodin because the decomposition mechanism is currently
supported neither by the platform nor by any other tool.
5. Generalisation to Specification of Other
Multi-Agents Systems
The platooning case study presented before is a good
example for the Event-B specifications and verification by
proof of other situated MAS. Its development provides us
some guidelines we summarised in this section.
To specify the perceptions and the influences of the
agents and the environment parts specific to each agent, the
use of functional variables is a convenient manner of mod-
elling them with Event-B. Other variables can be added to
the environment to represent independant parts of agents.
The way of specifying the synchronisation proposed by
the I/R model can be generalised. Three variables r_agent,
d_agent and p_agent (defined on 1..MAX_AGENTS) are
counters which indicate the step in the I/R cycle.
The various events are introduced by refinement, follow-
ing the I/R model. Events are gradually introduced, start-
ing by the last, i.e. the environment reaction, to finish by
the first step, i.e. the agents perceptions (See Fig. 2). The
guards of the old events are strengthened to ensure that the
new events are done before the old ones are enabled and a
variant is dedicated to preventing the new events from tak-
ing the control forever.
Reaction step Three levels of refinement are dedicated to
the specification of the reaction. Safety properties of the
environment are expressed at the beginning. They must be
preserved by the agents: the refinement also ensures that
they are preserved throughout the evolution of the model.
Currently, the splitting of a global reaction into a reaction
expressed agent by agent specified into platoon_1 cannot
be done. The majority of MAS has a global reaction that
only expresses all the influences in a global manner. Other
levels of refinement might be necessary when the splitting
is possible, though.
Influences are taken into account as an event’s parameter
into platoon_2. If the computation of the reaction is com-
plex, more than one refinement can be necessary to help the
prover.
Decision step This step is progressively introduced. In-
fluences are applied to reaction into platoon_2. Events cor-
responding to the decision step are introduced in platoon_3.
The “real” computation of influences taking into account
the perceptions is done into platoon_4.
Perception step It is the last part of a MAS we model.
Perceptions are introduced into platoon_4 and directly
linked with influences. In some more complex cases, it
seems easier to first introduce the perception step into a
first level of refinement before linking perceptions and in-
fluences into a second one.
Remark Some MAS have a local behaviour between the
perception and decision step. This local behaviour mod-
ifies some local variables as historic variables, which are
considered for taking the decision. This kind of agents is
called hysteretic contrary to the tropistic agents which have
no internal behaviour. Local behaviour can be specified by
inserting some refinement levels between the decision level
and the perception level.
About decomposition The decomposition step sketched
in Subsect. 4.6 can also be generalised to obtain two Event-
B components Environment and Agents. The following ta-
ble summarises how the various parts of the initial model
are assigned to the components:
Environment Agents
r_agent, d_agent and p_agent external external
Perceived physical variables external external
Unperceived physical variables internal -
Perceptions variables - internal
Influences variables external external
Perception events external internal
Decision events external internal
Reaction events internal external
6. Related Works
Hilaire et al [9] propose a general framework for mod-
elling MAS based on Object-Z and statecharts. This frame-
work focuses on organisational aspects in order to represent
agents and their roles. Similarly, Regayeg et al [11] com-
bine Z notations and linear temporal logic to specify the
internal part of agents and the specification of the commu-
nication protocols between agents. They propose general
patterns and the use of Z support tools to model-check their
specifications. It is to be noticed that the proposed patterns
do not deal with dynamics of physical world.
Inverno and Saunders [10] have developed a multi-agent
approach for simulating the behaviour of stem cells. Their
aim is to highlight which properties are required on compo-
nents in order to maintain general properties. Their formal
models, written in Z, are based on a layered technique in
which physical, biological and chemical environment are
considered separately.
We can also point out a work [6] involving the use of
classical B to model agents roles and interactions. [3] fo-
cuses too on the interaction protocol between agents us-
ing Event-B. Some patterns for the B specification of fault-
tolerance protocols are proposed in the case of agent com-
munication.
Schneider et al [12] apply their framework based on CSP
and B as a starting point for the simulation of a biomedicine
MAS. They only focus on the clotting behaviour of artificial
platelets.
7. Conclusion
The models presented in Sect. 4 are completely speci-
fied into Rodin, the platform which supports the Event-B
formalism. The generated POs are validated to ensure the
correction of the specification. Results regarding POs are
given Fig. 4. As expected, the number of POs increases
with each refinement step. The majority of them are auto-
matically discharged by the prover and the others are done
interactively : difficulties come mainly from arithmetics.
Figure 4. Proof obligations results
The Event-B specification of the platooning problem
presented here shows some advantages of using a formal
method to model MAS: the formalisation focuses on un-
derstanding the MAS. The proof process helps identifying
mistakes in the model and pinpointing weaknesses in the
assessment of the hypotheses. Not surprisingly from a soft-
ware engineering point of view, knowledge of the experts of
the domain was required for completing the hypotheses of
the system.
From the case study of the platooning, we thus extract
some generic guidelines for the development with Event-B
of other situated MAS taking agents-specific features into
account. We plan to study other situated MAS following
the same guidelines.
Further work includes the study of the same platooning
problem with related formalisms such as CSP‖B [12] to fo-
cus on the interaction protocol between the agents. It also
includes the specification and verification of other proper-
ties, such as unhooking or oscillation. We also plan to make
the model evolve in order to take into account the lateral
control or perturbations like pedestrians or other vehicles in
the environment.
Acknowledgements We address our many thanks for
common efforts and fruitful discussions to Olivier Simonin,
Alexis Scheuer and François Charpillet, from the MAIA
team of the LORIA, and to Samuel Colin and Jeanine
Souquières, from the DEDALE team.
References
[1] J.-R. Abrial. The B Book. Cambridge University Press,
1996.
[2] J.-R. Abrial and S. Hallerstede. Refinement, decomposition,
and instantiation of discrete models: Application to Event-
B. Fundamenta Informaticae, 77(1-2):1–28, 2007. Special
issue on ASM’05.
[3] E. Ball and M. Butler. Event-B patterns for specifying
fault-tolerance in Multi-Agent interaction. In Proceedings
of Methods, Models and Tools for Fault Tolerance, Oxford,
UK, July 2007.
[4] P. Daviet andM. Parent. Longitudinal and lateral servoing of
vehicles in a platoon. In Proceeding of the IEEE Intelligent
Vehicles Symposium, pages 41–46, 1996.
[5] E. W. Dijkstra. A Discipline of Programming. Prentice Hall,
1976.
[6] H. Fadil and J. Koning. A formal approach to model mul-
tiagent interactions using the B formal method. In Fourth
IEEE International Symposium on Advanced Distributed
Systems (ISADS 2005), volume 3563 of LNCS, pages 516–
528. Springer, 2005.
[7] J. Ferber. Multi-Agent Systems: An Introduction to Dis-
tributed Artificial Intelligence. Addison-wesley Profes-
sional, 1999.
[8] J. Ferber and J. P. Muller. Influences and reaction : a model
of situated multiagent systems. In 2nd Int. Conf. on Multi-
agent Systems, pages 72–79, 1996.
[9] V. Hilaire, P. Gruer, A. Koukam, and O. Simonin. Formal
specification approach of role dynamics in agent organisa-
tions: Application to the Satisfaction-Altruism Model. In
Int. Jour. of Software Engineering and Knowledge Engineer-
ing (IJSEKE). in press, 2006.
[10] M. Inverno and R. Saunders. Agent-based modelling of
Stem Cell organisation in a Niche. In S. A. Brueckner,
G. Di Marzo, S. A. Karageorgos, and R. Nagpal, editors,
Engineering Self-Organising Systems : Methodologies and
Applications, LNAI. Springer-Verlag, 2005.
[11] A. Regayeg, A. H. Kacem, and M. Jmaiel. Specification
and verification of multi-agent applications using temporal
z. In Intelligent Agent Technology Conf. (IAT’04), pages
260–266. IEEE Computer Society, 2004.
[12] S. Schneider, A. Cavalcanti, H. Treharne, and J. Woodcock.
A layered behavioural model of platelets. In 11th IEEE
International Conference on Engieerging of Complex Com-
puter Systems, ICECCS, 2006.
[13] O. Simonin, A. Lanoix, S. Colin, A. Scheuer, and F. Charpil-
let. Generic Expression in B of the Influence/Reaction
Model: Specifying and Verifying Situated Multi-Agent Sys-
tems. INRIA Research Report 6304, INRIA, Sept. 2007.
